Shattering the nuclear sword

A NUCLEAR WEAPON IN MUMBAI: THE UNTHINKABLE

As the horrific attacks on Mumbai are still in their last stages, I keep on worrying about only one scenario; a nuclear weapon detonated on Indian soil, perhaps in Mumbai. The thought makes me shudder and lose at least a little sleep at night.

Several top analysts in the US such as Graham Allison and Joseph Cirincione have identified kinks in the US security system, especially in border security, that would make it possible for terrorists to use a nuclear weapon on American soil. Allison thinks that a nuclear attack of some kind and magnitude on US soil may already be overdue. If that’s the case with the United States which is still one of the most relatively secure places in the world, one can only imagine that the scenario would be much worse in India.

It is very difficult to overestimate the effects of a weapon with even a 1 kiloton yield- a dismal yield by any standards- in a city like Mumbai, irrespective of the time of the day. A more typical scenario usually talks about a 10 kiloton weapon, but as in other such scenarios, it’s always best to be as conservative as possible and then extrapolate to worse cases. Now, the 20 kiloton bomb in Hiroshima killed at least 100,000. Mumbai’s population is an astounding 20 million compared to Hiroshima’s 300-400,000 at the time of the atomic bombing.

Let’s imagine a macabre scenario for a second in which a extremely watered down 1 kT bomb was detonated at Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus, the same location where the terrorists began their killing spree. Extensively depending on the conditions including structures of buildings, wind patterns, road traffic, presence of combustible material and other variables, such a blast could essentially level most of the buildings in the Fort area (within a radius of 1 km or so), including all the famous hotels which the terrorists targeted. There would be almost total and instant loss of human life within this radius, probably numbering in a few thousands right there and then. Those who were not directly struck by the shock wave would be obliterated with shards of flying glass, metal and construction material. Given enough combustible material around, thermal radiation from the blast could also start fires, the effects of which were historically neglected in some such studies. Such fires could seal the fate of people trapped in buildings, many of whom will be seriously injured to begin with. Farther from the blast, prompt and delayed radiation would bathe people and property for miles, essentially shutting down the financial part of the city including the BSE for at least months. The effect on the economy would be devastating.

A dirty bomb detonated in Mumbai with materials like strontium 90, cesium 137 or the infamous polonium 210 would limit the (still significant) blast and thermal effects to the conventional explosive used to package the radioactive material, but the radiation effects would still kill or incapacitate thousands, render large swathes of real estate inhospitable for years, and at the very least severely cripple the financial and commercial sector of the Indian economy, a consequence whose aftereffects themselves would be disastrous in several ways. Similar effects of varying magnitude would be visible in any other of India’s biggest or second-biggest cities. Dozens of well-known and loved names spring to mind; Bangalore, Chennai, Delhi, Calcutta, Chandigarh, Pune, Trivendrum, Jaipur and Varanasi to name a few.

The above scenario discussed a weapon with an embarrassingly low yield. There are ‘suitcase’ nuclear weapons small enough to fit in a backpack with yields from 1-10 kilotons. Even by the most abysmally conservative estimate, at least 100,000 people could die in Mumbai from the immediate (blast, radiation, thermal) and delayed (radiation) effects of such a ‘small’ 1 kT explosion. A more typical 10 kT weapon would extend the above effects to at least Churchgate, Grant Road, Marine Lines and Girgaon. The death toll from such an explosion could be 500,000 or so, more than twice the total number of people killed by the devastating 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Either the former or certainly this would be a number beyond imagination and a catastrophe beyond comprehension. It will create complete chaos in the country, and the resulting civil strife and riots might kill thousands more.

Sadly, what’s really frightening is that smuggling in a small weapon with a 1 kiloton yield could be cakewalk for terrorists. This is not fear-mongering or paranoia. Weapons-grade uranium, especially when concealed beneath common and heavy tamper and shielding materials, can be extremely difficult to detect by most conventional radiation counters (Weapons-grade plutonium which has a higher energy gamma and neutron radiation signature is easier, although still not trivial). It would be relatively easy to detect such uranium if suspected containers could be leisurely inspected over a period of several hours. It is quite a challenge on the other hand to detect such a bomb among the thousands of containers that rapidly flow across India’s borders every single day. Considering that Mumbai itself handles 50% of India’s maritime traffic, this becomes a weapons detection nightmare. India’s long sea and land borders thwart this attempt even more, the same way they thwart it in the US. And it goes without saying that once inside the country, the high population, facile movement of goods across state borders, immense network of road and train networks and the inadequacy of security at all these routes and points would make it virtually impossible to detect such a weapon. Being of similar appearance, language and culture, the terrorists who escort this deadly device would seamlessly blend in among the population, most of which is busy securing its own square meals to be vigilant.

Nor would it be impossible to obtain such a weapon in the first place, even though this would probably be the most challenging task of all. Analysts have estimated that the price of a 10 kiloton nuclear weapon in the black market may be about 10 million dollars. Based on the quality and yield, this price could possibly drop down to 2-5 million dollars. It is not very difficult for networks like Al Qaeda to secure such a weapon and then, even if they don’t use it themselves, auction it off to eager bidders who would carry out both their own objectives as well as that of Al Qaeda’s. Evidence suggests that Al Qaeda has already courted Pakistani scientists about nuclear know how as well as material once or twice (Cirincione, 2006). B. Raman in a heartfelt essay worries about the fate of our nuclear materials and weapons and loses sleep over it. I think he should lose even more sleep over it because as far as I know, our own nukes and materials are not the most attractive target for terrorists. The most lucrative weapons raw materials and perhaps weapons themselves have been thought to be loose nukes in the former Soviet Union (Allison, 2004). There were roughly 20,000 nukes in the Soviet Union around the time of its demise. Assuming that only 1% of these nuclear weapons failed to be secured, it still means that an alarming 200 are unaccounted for. Even one weapon among these with its yield degraded would be enough to cause the above catastrophe. A slightly more benign but still volatile scenario exists with Pakistan’s nukes.

For now, terrorists have taken the even more easier way out of using conventional weapons and crude tactics. These crude tactics killed ‘only’ 125 and have shaken a city and nation’s soul. The event has left us even more stunned and disturbed because of the sheer viciousness, bravado and efficiency of the terrorists. We better not even try to imagine what it would be like with a crude nuclear weapon or dirty bomb. Mr. Prime Minister, no more words; we already know as much as you do what you want to convey to us. We need action now.

RICHARD RHODES@GOOGLE

As part of the Authors@Google talk series that Google has organised, everyone’s favourite nuclear historian Richard Rhodes gave a talk at the company, partly on general nuclear history and policy and partly about his new book (which I reviewed here). In the end, he asked the bright folks at Google for advice about how best one could possibly implement an international system of tracking nuclear material.

There were several interesting points about both history and current policy that he made that I think are worth noting as summaries (for those who may not have the time to watch the entire one hour talk)

1. Paul Nitze was a highly influential official in the State Department who served through six administrations, advising presidents on nuclear policy. After surveying the damage caused by atomic bombs in Japan and comparing it with the damage caused by strategic bombing, he erroneously concluded that atomic weapons are not much different in their effects from conventional incendiary bombing. He set the tone for policy partly grounded in this belief in 1950 when he drafted a key document named NSC 68 which outlined George Kennan’s containment doctrine and advocated increasing nuclear weapons building as the best way to counter the Soviets. Although the report was opposed for its exaggerated tone by some, the Korean War that began that year sealed the deal, and the report more or less set the tone for US nuclear policy for the next six decades. Nitze could well be called the “father of threat inflation”

2. Most of the estimates about nuclear weapon targeting made during the Cold War or at least during the early years were underestimates because they neglected the effects of fire. Fire effects and the resulting strong winds cause a firestorm in a nuclear attack, and they can contribute up to 60% of all the effects. Most initial calculations only included blast effects. In a somewhat dramatic illustration, Rhodes showed the possible blast and fire radius of an attack on Google with a 300 kT weapon. The fire radius is much larger than the blast radius, and in addition fires can spread far and wide depending on vegetation.

3. In another telling illustration, Rhodes showed the nuclear winter that would result from a “limited” exchange of about a megaton between India and Pakistan. Within a few months, the simulation shows that the average temperature of the world could drop by 5 degrees, a catastrophic result. One can scarcely comprehend the nuclear winter that would have resulted from an estimated exchange of 10,000 megatons between the two Cold War superpowers. The illustration showed that even a small regional war waged with nuclear weapons could have extremely serious global consequences.

4. The real problem with nuclear proliferation is that like any complex machine, the system can go haywire and is subject to “normal accidents”. More accounts than would make us comfortable exist of nuclear weapons accidentally armed or delivered somewhere instead of conventional weapons. Rhodes also noted that both the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals don’t have Permissive Action Locks (PALs). This makes the situation uncomfortable. I am interested in knowing his sources for this information.

5. Rhodes again outlined an ambitious plan by many former US experts including Henry Kissinger, George Schultz and Sam Nunn for universal disarmament. These gentlemen were early advocates of security through minimal deterrents. But after 9/11, they realised that nuclear terrorism makes only universal disarmament an ideal goal to be pursued for securing peace. Rhodes makes the accurate observation that nuclear proliferation can be stopped only by satisfying nations’ security needs. However, I disagree with his projection for Pakistan’s nuclear disarmament. Senior Pakistani officials have ostensibly said that they would disarm if India would disarm. But I doubt it because the Pakistani arsenal (about 40 weapons) is as much a deterrent against India’s conventional forces superiority as it is against India’s nuclear arsenal (about 60 weapons), and India inherently has the conventional advantage because of its size and resources. I don’t see how this could stop being seen as a threat by the Pakistanis.

NUCLEAR TERRORISM’S UNHEEDED ASSUMPTIONS?

Nuclear terrorism forms an important part of the armamentarium of one of the Bush administration’s favourite pastimes- threat inflation. While it is true that the potential damage that terrorists could cause with even a 1 kT nuclear weapon is tremendous (Times Square NYC, noon on a weekday), there are many very realistic obstacles they need to overcome before they can acquire, process, build, transport and use any kind of a nuclear weapon.

The more realistic fear that governments and the public have is about dirty bombs, explosives packaged together with low-tech dispersive radioactive material that would largely circumvent the need to achieve the myriad steps needed to be in charge of a bonafide atomic device.

Writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges two assumptions made by proponents of a nuclear terrorist attack scenario: access to knowledge and the existence of a nuclear black market (exemplified by black market czar Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan). Gormley correctly tackles the myth of easy access to nuclear material and knowledge and identifies the slip between the cup and the lip- from knowledge to working product.

She also questions the ease of facilitation of trade in the nuclear black market and doubts the existence of a dedicated clientele, an essential feature of any black market. The clientele should also have the understanding and sophistication to purchase and process nuclear material (In the early days of Al Qaeda, Bin Laden was had when someone sold him mercuric oxide as yellowcake).

Lastly, she questions the nature of materials that have been implicated in nuclear smuggling until now, most of which included depleted uranium and isotopes like Osmium 167, too ineffectual in a dirty bomb, let alone a weapon.

But I think she is missing out on three other important isotopes which are widespread products of research reactors, large scale reactors as well as medical research reactors- Iodine 131, Cesium 137 and Strontium 90. Out of these, Iodine 131 can be absorbed by the thyroid gland and leads to thyroid cancer, but its effects can be thwarted rather easily by ingesting tablets made of normal non-radioactive iodine, provided such tablets are easily available (the slow dissemination of these tablets was partly responsible for the large number of deaths from Chernobyl). Cs 137 and Sr 90 pose more serious problems, and I would think that more than anything else they would be choice materials for a dirty bomb. Both isotopes seem to strike the golden mean for radioactive lethality, possessing half-lives of 30 years and 28 years respectively; long enough to compare to a human life span, and short enough to be intensely radioactive. Moreoever, both elements chemically resemble two key elements in the human body. Cs 137 behaves somewhat like potassium and distributes throughout body fluids and compartments, whereas Sr 90 resembles calcium and deposits in bones, greatly increasing the risk of bone cancer. Both elements if ingested in reasonable amounts will pose almost irreparable risk and cause permanent damage.

I certainly don’t think one should be immediately paranoid about these isotopes, but it is clear that if they wanted to, terrorists could steal them from multiple sources. I would think that any perceived scenario involving terrorists and dirty bombs should include discussion of these three isotopes, which because of their ease of access and purity are in some ways much more lethal than uranium or plutonium.